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We are witnessing a re-emergence of the practice of public shaming, especially 
shaming carried out with the use of the Internet. The following two cases are typical 
of the phenomenon. 
In October 2012, Lindsey Stone was on a trip to Washington DC as a caregiver 
for a group of adults with learning difficulties. Stone had a running joke with a 
colleague, Jamie Schuh, where they took humorous photographs, such as them 
smoking in front of a “No Smoking” sign. While at Arlington National Cemetery, 
Schuh photographed Stone raising her middle finger and pretending to be shouting 
in front of a sign reading “Silence and Respect”. Thinking it hilarious, Schuh 
posted the photo on Facebook, with Stone’s consent. Four weeks’ later, Twitter 
and Facebook were abuzz with outrage at the photo. Messages ranged from “Lind-
sey Stone hates the military and hates soldiers who have died in foreign wars” to 
“Send the dumb feminist to prison” to “Hope this cunt gets raped and stabbed to 
death”. A “Fire Lindsey Stone” Facebook page was created, and attracted 12,000 
likes overnight. The next day, Stone lost her job. As a result, “she fell into depres-
sion, became an insomniac, and barely left home for a year”.1 Stone applied for 
many other jobs as a caregiver during this time, but never heard back. Eventually 
she did manage to get a new job, but lived in constant fear that her new employers 
would discover the photo and fire her.  
In June 2015, biochemist Tim Hunt gave a toast at a lunch sponsored by the Korea 
Federation of Women’s Science and Technology Associations, during the World 
Conference of Science Journalists in Seoul. According to one account, in the 
speech, Hunt said: 
“It’s strange that a chauvinist monster like me has been asked to speak 
to women scientists. Let me tell you about my trouble with girls. Three 
things happen when they are in the lab: You fall in love with them, they 
fall in love with you, and when you criticize them, they cry. Perhaps we 
should make separate labs for boys and girls. Now seriously, I’m im-
pressed by the economic development of Korea. And women scien-
tists played, without doubt, an important role in it. Science needs 
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women, and you should do science despite the obstacles and despite 
monsters like me!”2 
Connie St Louis, a science journalist who was present, tweeted Hunt’s comments 
regarding crying female scientists and single-sex labs, stating that the lunch had 
been “utterly ruined by sexist speaker Tim Hunt”.3 The comments quickly at-
tracted a great deal of criticism on social media, with many arguing that they re-
flected broader misogynistic attitudes within the scientific community. The 
mainstream media picked up on the story, and reported it widely.
4
 As a result, 
Hunt was forced to resign from his positions at University College London, The 
Royal Society, and The European Research Council. A few days later, Hunt apol-
ogized for his comments, which he said were “inexcusable” but were made “in a 
totally jocular, ironic way”.5 He later said that the barrage of criticism had led him 
to consider taking his own life.
6
 
What should we make of such cases? The most obvious point is that many of those 
who took part in this public shaming acted reprehensibly by subjecting the shamed 
to threats, insults, and abuse. This is clearly morally objectionable. In addition to 
this, the consequences for the shamed ended up being severely disproportionate. 
Neither Stone nor Hunt did anything to warrant losing their jobs or suffering such 
deep distress. 
Beyond this, matters are less clear. We might think that Stone and Hunt acted 
wrongly. Their actions arguably violated justified social norms, which play an im-
portant role in enabling us to live together civilly. Upholding social norms might 
well involve criticizing those violators. Making this criticism public can help to re-
inforce our collective commitment to the norms, and can deter prospective future 
violators. Public shaming may thus be one way in which ordinary people can shape 
our shared social environment for the better. Perhaps we should laude it as a de-
mocratized way in which the public can mold civil society. 
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This conclusion strikes many of us as too quick, however. One might be troubled 
by our opening cases, even if one accepts that Stone and Hunt did something 
wrong and that those who criticized them were seeking to uphold justified social 
norms. What, then, if anything, is wrong in these kinds of cases? This paper an-
swers this question by conceptualizing public shaming as a sanction imposed on 
norm violators, and then developing a framework for assessing the justifiability of 
this sanction. Specifically, we identify five constraints on public shaming, and con-
tend that a particular instance of shaming is justifiable if and only if each of these 
constraints is met. We then consider online public shaming in particular, and high-
light several reasons to be concerned about this practice. Online public shaming 
frequently violates the constraints we identify, and the nature of online interaction 
makes it difficult, although not impossible, for those constraints to be fulfilled. Pub-
lic shaming is justifiable only as a morally acceptable sanction, and many instances 
of online public shaming will not qualify as such. 
We conceptualize public shaming as a practice of public moral criticism in re-
sponse to violations of social norms. This practice is our focus throughout, and we 
take our opening cases to be paradigmatic examples. We use the term “public 
shaming” to refer to this practice for two reasons. First, “public shaming” has be-
come the common term for this phenomenon. It has been popularized by Jennifer 
Jacquet, who also highlights the connection between public shaming and social 
norms, and Jon Ronson, who describes many of the cases that we discuss.
7
 Of 
course, there are many things going on in these cases besides norm-reinforcing 
public moral criticism. For example, Jacquet also discusses public moral criticism 
intended to create new social norms, which falls outside the scope of our inquiry. 
Nonetheless, norm-reinforcing criticism is undoubtedly one practice commonly 
picked out by the term “public shaming”. Second, “public shaming” is a philosoph-
ically appropriate label in so far as public moral criticism is likely to cause shame, 
the presence of shame may play a significant causal role in explaining its efficacy as 
a sanction, and these facts are relevant to our moral evaluation of the practice. 
We recognize that this conceptualisation differs from two alternative definitions of 
shaming that might seem natural. The first identifies shaming with actions aimed 
at inducing shame. We choose not to adopt this focus, since those who participate 
in the practice in which we are interested are not necessarily aiming to induce 
shame in their targets. Those who engage in online public shaming are seeking to 
draw attention to a social norm violation, and to rally others to their cause.
8
 They 
may or may not also be aiming to induce shame. Furthermore, the phenomenon 
in which we are interested – that is, public moral criticism in response to violations 
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of social norms – is a widespread phenomenon whose moral dimensions are un-
derexplored, yet merit sustained analysis.
9
 The moral status of actions aimed at 
inducing shame, and of the resulting experience of shame, in contrast, has received 
greater attention.
10
 
The second definition identifies shaming with especially nasty forms of public crit-
icism, such that only highly personalized, abusive, and vitriolic attacks that demean 
their victims count as “public shaming”. In this case, public shaming would pre-
sumably be impermissible in (nearly) all cases. An advantage of our definition is 
that it corresponds to a widespread and philosophically interesting phenomenon, 
yet does not settle important moral disputes in advance. In contrast, a moralized 
definition identifying public shaming with demeaning and humiliating conduct 
makes it true by definition that there is something objectionable about the practice. 
All of the action would therefore be in determining what forms of criticism count 
as shaming. 
Those who favor one of these alternative definitions – or indeed some other one 
– might consider our usage of “public shaming” to be a misnomer. Ultimately, we 
need not take a stand on this terminological dispute. The reader should feel free 
to adopt a different name for the practice on which we focus, such as “public blam-
ing”, if she thinks it important to do so. The key is that we are interested in a 
particular kind of response to social norm violations, namely public moral criticism 
of the violation. This is what we mean by the term “public shaming”. 
The paper is structured as follows. We first outline some of the pertinent features 
of social norms, and discuss the role of public criticism in upholding those norms. 
We then identify five constraints on public shaming. Next, we respond to an ob-
jection that claims that public shaming is always unjustifiable. We then apply our 
framework, focusing on online public shaming, and highlighting the features of 
online interaction that often lead to the violation of the constraints. We conclude 
with some reflections on what might be done about the widespread phenomenon 
of unjustified online public shaming. 
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Social Norms and Public Criticism 
Social norms are rules that govern the attitudes and behavior of members of a 
group, specifying how those individuals ought (not) to act. Four features of social 
norms are relevant for our discussion. First, norms specify standards to which 
members expect one another to adhere.
11
 In order to be effective regulators of 
behavior, they typically must satisfy conditions for publicity. They must be (i) a 
matter of common knowledge, or at least widely known; (ii) sufficiently determi-
nate, such that members know how they are required to act; and (iii) publicly veri-
fiable, such that there can be widespread knowledge of the extent to which others 
comply with their demands. 
Second, social norms concern a wider range of conduct than that regulated by law. 
These norms govern conduct that ought to be insulated from legal regulation, for 
principled or practical reasons, as well as conduct that should be subject to legal 
regulation, but in fact is not. Some theorists define norms as rules that lack an 
official source, such as government, and are not enforced through official sanc-
tion.
12
 On this view, laws are distinct from norms. Others see norms and law as 
overlapping, with crimes being violations of social norms that society enforces 
through formal punishment.
13
 Either way, all agree that norms encompass a litany 
of rules that go beyond the law – rules of etiquette, manners, fair play, respect, and 
so on. 
Third, social norms are enforced through both internal and external sanctions. 
Members of the group generally take the norms to be authoritative for them. They 
accept or internalize these norms, such that they consider themselves duty-bound 
to comply with them and are likely to feel guilt or shame if they violate them. 
Sometimes, these internal sanctions may be sufficient to ensure that the norms are 
upheld. Often, however, this depends also on the possibility that others will find 
out about norm violations and subject norm violators to criticism, as well as nega-
tive reactive attitudes. These external sanctions can morally fortify individuals who 
cannot reliably depend on internal sanctions doing the job.
14
 Ideally, these external 
sanctions should not crowd out the internal sanctions. That is, it is preferable for 
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individuals to uphold social norms because they recognize the moral reasons that 
support those norms, and not wholly because they fear losing social standing. 
Finally, the combination of internal and external sanctions enforcing social norms 
makes them effective regulators of individuals’ behavior.15 As Emily McTernan 
notes, empirical research shows that “social norms are powerful determinants of 
behavior, and secure stable patterns of behavior from the majority of those who 
internalise the norm”.16 Further, they are essential for ensuring peaceful and coop-
erative coexistence. As Daniel Solove puts it, “Norms bind societies together; they 
regulate everyday conduct; they foster civility. They are the oil that reduces the 
friction of human interaction… In short, norms are a central mechanism through 
which a society exercises social control”.17 
As we have already intimated, public criticism is an important way in which social 
norms are upheld and reinforced.
18
 It helps to distinguish three roles that such crit-
icism can play. First, public criticism can play a communicative role. One aspect 
of this role is making the violator aware that she has violated a morally authoritative 
social norm.
19
 Ideally, this will lead her to recognize that she has acted wrongly, feel 
remorse for this misconduct, and commit to complying with the norm in future.
20
 
These responses might be appropriately reflected in her apologizing for her action. 
A second aspect of the communicative role relates to the victims of wrongdoing, in 
cases where norm violations wrong specific individuals. Those individuals can rec-
ognize that others are unwilling to let the wrongdoing go uncriticized, and thus have 
a strengthened sense of solidarity with the group. In some cases, others might have 
duties to criticize norm violators publicly, in order to stand with the wronged and 
avoid conniving with wrongdoing. 
Second, public criticism can play a deterrence-based role in reducing future norm 
violations, by both the norm violator and others. Individuals are less likely to diso-
bey social norms if they believe that they will be externally sanctioned for doing so. 
In this way, public criticism can help to protect potential victims against future vio-
lations. 
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Third, public criticism provides a way in which to affirm morally authoritative so-
cial norms publicly. We can call this the expressive role. This role has instrumental 
value, in that it can strengthen our shared sense of commitment to the norm. This 
relates to our earlier remarks about publicity: public criticism can increase our 
common knowledge of (i) what the norm is; (ii) what it demands in particular situ-
ations; and (iii) when it has been violated. In these ways, public criticism enables 
us collectively to reaffirm our endorsement of the norm, and of the values it pro-
motes or respects. 
When social norms directly instantiate norm-independent moral requirements, 
public affirmation may also be intrinsically valuable. For example, we might think 
that it is intrinsically valuable publicly to condemn racism and other offensive 
views, irrespective of whether this serves any communicative or deterrence-based 
purpose. Such condemnation is in itself a fitting response to serious moral viola-
tions.  
For criticism to play all three of these roles, or at least to play all three well, it must 
be public. Whilst privately chiding the norm violator might successfully cause her 
to recognize her wrongdoing (one aspect of the communicative role), it is likely to 
be less effective as a deterrent. This is both because private criticism typically im-
poses fewer burdens than public criticism, and because others might not be aware 
of private criticism and so will not be deterred from similar norm violations. More-
over, it is essential for the criticism to be public if it is to reinforce our shared 
commitment to the norm (the expressive role) and to communicate solidarity with 
the wronged (the other aspect of the communicative role). Public moral criticism 
thus involves a practice of public accountability, in which individuals publicly hold 
one another responsible for norm violations in a way that serves several morally 
valuable purposes. 
The public nature of such criticism also brings distinct complications, however, 
since it increases the risk that criticism will violate moral constraints. This is be-
cause, when criticism is conducted in front of larger audiences, or when more peo-
ple participate, it becomes more difficult to control the effects of criticism. In turn, 
this fuels a number of concerns that jeopardize the justifiability of the practice, 
including worries relating to proportionality, respect for privacy, and non-abusive-
ness – all of which we discuss below. For these reasons, criticism being public is a 
double-edged sword that can be a force for both good and bad. It is the public 
nature of public criticism that makes it particularly morally interesting and that calls 
for the attention that we give the phenomenon in this paper. 
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Constraints on Public Shaming 
In this section, we identify five constraints on public shaming.
21
 There is a justifica-
tion for public shaming if and only if each of these constraints is met. This is not 
to say that any shaming act that meets these conditions is in fact justified. In order 
for that to be the case, the individuals who participate in public shaming must also 
have the right to perform this act. The fact that there is a justification for shaming, 
by virtue of the constraints being met, does not necessarily mean that everyone has 
the right to shame. The possession of this right might further require a certain kind 
of moral standing and/or acting with certain intentions. We lack space to explore 
these issues, and limit our attention to the prior question of when public shaming 
has a justification. To put this another way, our focus is on when public shaming is 
justifiable rather than when it is justified. 
Two further clarifications are in order. First, our analysis identifies the moral prin-
ciples that govern public shaming. There is a distinct question about which laws 
and conventions should govern this practice. We turn to this more downstream 
issue in the final section. Second, we provide an account of only the prima facie 
justifiability of public shaming. An instance of public shaming that is prima facie 
unjustifiable according to our framework may turn out to be justifiable all things 
considered if, say, it is necessary for avoiding catastrophe. We suspect there are 
few exceptions of this kind. 
1. Proportionality. An instance of public shaming is proportionate when its nega-
tive consequences are not excessive in comparison with its positive consequences.
22
 
Sometimes, the negative consequences are not excessive because they fall exclu-
sively on an individual who has made herself liable to this treatment by culpably 
violating a morally authoritative social norm. The positive consequences morally 
outweigh the negative, and the negative are within the bounds of that to which the 
norm violator has made herself liable. When this is the case, public shaming is 
narrowly proportionate. In other cases, the negative consequences exceed that to 
which the norm violator is liable and/or they fall on third parties. In these cases, in 
which public shaming is narrowly disproportionate, the negative consequences 
count as excessive unless the positive consequences of public shaming are much 
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more valuable than the negative consequences it imposes. When this is the case, 
public shaming is widely proportionate.  
The standard for what counts as excessive is more demanding in calculations of 
wide proportionality than in calculations of narrow proportionality. This is because 
negative consequences are more difficult to justify when they fall on those who are 
not liable. This distinction between narrow and wide proportionality enables us to 
make sense of the judgment that costs that it would be disproportionate to impose 
on third parties may be proportionate when imposed on those who have acted 
wrongly. 
The rest of this subsection further clarifies these ideas, to show their bearing on 
the case of public shaming. First, for public shaming to be proportionate – narrowly 
or widely –, the social norm that it enforces must be morally authoritative, in the 
sense that individuals are under a duty to comply with it. This is not to say that the 
norm itself is morally required, or even morally optimal. Suppose we were to dis-
cover a new method of allocating seats on buses that was fairer and more efficient 
than queuing. This would call into question whether the current social norm is 
morally optimal. But it would not – immediately, at least – call into question 
whether compliance with the existing social norm is morally required. Given that 
queuing is acceptably fair and efficient, and creates goods of peaceful coordination, 
individuals still have duties to comply with the existing norm.
23
 
The reason that shaming targeted at violations of norms with which individuals lack 
a duty to comply cannot be proportionate is that the norm violator will not have 
acted wrongly, and so will not have made herself liable to this treatment.
24
 This is 
the case for both social norms that lack moral content (such as a social norm within 
a workplace that women wear skirts) and social norms whose moral content is not 
sufficiently weighty to generate duties (arguably, such as a social norm to take out 
one’s rubbish on the morning of collection rather than the night before). It is con-
sistent with this conclusion that other kinds of responses to these norm violations 
may be justifiable, such as private criticism or public persuasion. 
Any account of when an individual is duty-bound to comply with a given norm will 
depend on one’s broader moral and political commitments. However, it is essen-
tial not to limit this to only those norms that instantiate norm-independent moral 
duties. We should allow that individuals are under a duty to comply with some 
norms of politeness and etiquette, even though they do not directly instantiate 
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norm-independent moral requirements. Adopting legal terminology, we might say 
that violations of such norms are mala prohibita rather than mala in se. 
With regard to narrow proportionality, several factors affect the extent of an indi-
vidual’s liability, and thus the negative consequences they can justifiably be made 
to bear. Perhaps the most important of these is the seriousness of the norm viola-
tion. Other things equal, those who violate more important social norms – that is, 
norms with which we have stronger duties to comply –, such as norms against racist 
speech, can be more liable than those who violate less serious social norms, such 
as norms of etiquette. Similarly, those who violate norms to a greater degree can 
be more liable than those who violate to a lesser degree. 
A second factor that can affect liability is culpability. The norm violator’s culpability 
increases with the extent to which she is responsible for the violation and not ex-
cused. Precisely which conditions must be satisfied here is a matter of intense dis-
pute. But almost all accounts agree that, in order to be culpable, the violator must 
have been able to gain knowledge of the relevant norm and her conduct must have 
breached the norm in a way that she could have reasonably foreseen. This fits with 
our earlier discussion of publicity. 
At this stage, it bears emphasizing that we restrict our attention to public shaming 
conceived of as a practice of public moral criticism in response to violations of 
social norms. That is, the cases in which we are interested are ones in which public 
moral criticism sanctions an individual who violates a prevailing social norm. It is 
in these cases that the violator’s liability hinges on her being able to foresee that 
her action violates the norm. We set aside two sets of closely-related but distinct 
cases in which the relationship between liability and culpability is more complex. 
First, there are cases in which public moral criticism is used in response to an in-
dividual violating a pre-existing moral duty that is not embodied in any prevailing 
social norm. Second, there are cases in which public moral criticism is used to 
establish a new social norm. These cases are like ours in so far as they involve 
public moral criticism, but they are unlike ours in so far as this criticism does not 
arise in response to the violation of an extant social norm. For this reason, these 
cases fall outside the scope of our investigation, and thus our view implies nothing 
about the relationship between liability and culpability in these tricky cases. We 
limit the scope of our inquiry in this way precisely because these related cases bring 
with them further complications that we lack space to explore. Those complica-
tions warrant sustained analysis, but our aim here is to establish a framework for 
assessing the justifiability of the simpler cases that fall within our conceptualization 
of public shaming. 
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A third factor affecting liability is the amount of harm caused by the norm violation. 
There are difficult questions about how to characterize this condition. For exam-
ple, should we take into account only the specific harms directly caused by this 
particular norm violation, or does the wider social context also affect the individ-
ual’s liability, such as when this norm violation contributes to a broader harmful 
practice? Hunt’s case is instructive here, assuming that he culpably violated a norm 
against sexism. If we take Hunt’s remark as an isolated incident, then his liability 
will be fairly restricted, given the fairly trivial effects that his words were likely to 
have. However, if we see his comments as contributing to a wider harmful practice 
of sexism within the scientific community, as his critics did, then we might see his 
liability as much greater. This will seem objectionable to some, since it means that 
Hunt’s personal liability is increased by others’ wrongdoing. But harmful practices 
are often constituted by many small infractions, each of which does little harm 
when considered in isolation, but that on aggregate cause great harm.
25
 If our as-
sessment of liability does not take this wider context into account, then we are likely 
to find that no one is liable to face public shaming. This seems unsatisfactory in 
the light of the overall harm, suggesting that the broader assessment is appropriate. 
Individuals can be highly liable due to contributing to a practice that causes great 
harm on aggregate. 
In order to satisfy narrow proportionality, public shaming must produce some pos-
itive consequences. However, the size of the positive consequences necessary de-
creases as the seriousness of the norm violation, culpability, and harm caused 
increase. Negative consequences that would otherwise be excessive in comparison 
with the positive consequences may turn out not to be excessive once we are ap-
propriately sensitive to the degree to which the norm violator has made herself 
liable.  
When performing the narrow proportionality calculation, it is important to take 
into account the full array of positive and negative consequences. On the positive 
side, we have the goods that public shaming brings about – the fulfillment of the 
communicative, deterrence-based, and expressive roles. On the negative side, we 
must include any material costs that follow, such as the loss of one’s job, as well as 
reputational and psychological harms, such as feelings of distress, humiliation, em-
barrassment, and shame. One factor that is likely to affect the magnitude of these 
reputational and psychological harms is the size of the audience before whom an 
individual is shamed. Shaming carried out in front of a larger audience, or in which 
more people participate, might well better fulfill the three roles of public criticism, 
but it will also impose greater harms. The size of the audience and the number of 
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participants is thus one thing that is governed by the proportionality constraint. 
Even if unrestrained, mob-like attacks on norm violators carried out before the 
general public are in some respects especially effective, they will often violate nar-
row proportionality. 
2. Necessity. In order to be justifiable, public shaming must effectively serve a com-
municative, deterrence-based, and/or expressive role and, crucially, it must achieve 
this outcome in a way that is no more harmful than any alternative mechanism that 
is not ruled out on other grounds. This constraint explains why it would be unjus-
tified to shame an individual publicly if we could take an alternative course of action 
that served these roles equally well while imposing fewer burdens, providing that 
this alternative did not violate other constraints. 
When judging whether a given instance of public shaming meets this constraint, we 
must consult all three of the roles that we have distinguished. Even if an act of 
public shaming lacked deterrent effects, for example, it might remain justifiable 
because of its communicative and/or expressive effects. Nonetheless, there cer-
tainly can be cases where public shaming is unnecessary to convey the wrongness 
of the norm violation to the violator, deter future violations, or to sustain the norm 
itself, such that this constraint is violated. Much public shaming might well take the 
form of “moral grandstanding” or “virtue-signaling”, whereby participants indicate 
their own moral virtue without any of the roles of public shaming being served.
26
 
The necessity constraint is importantly distinct from the proportionality constraint. 
Whereas the former requires comparing an instance of public shaming with alter-
native means that achieve the same aims, the latter requires a comparison between 
the positive and negative consequences of an instance of public shaming.
27
 
3. Respect for Privacy. Public shaming involves drawing attention to the conduct 
of norm violators, but it is essential that it is carried out in a way that respects rights 
to privacy. This generates two requirements. First, public shaming should not in-
volve dredging up irrelevant information or irrelevant facts about the norm viola-
tor’s past. Criticism should focus on the relevant attitudes and behavior of the norm 
violator, not on wider facts about her life. It can be wrong to publicize such infor-
mation, even when doing so is not disproportionate or abusive. This is because 
there is a right to privacy.
28
 
Second, it may sometimes be wrong to publicize information that is relevant but 
highly sensitive. For example, perhaps we ought not publicly to shame someone 
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for having an extramarital affair, on the grounds that this might be an entirely pri-
vate matter. Norm violators may have rights against others publicizing certain sen-
sitive information. The plausibility of this idea depends partly on which publicizing 
activities we have in mind. The right to privacy might condemn public shaming that 
involves making the information fully public by publishing it online or in newspa-
pers, for example. But it is less plausible to hold that it also condemns shaming 
that reveals information only to a select group of individuals. 
Violations of privacy will likely affect proportionality, but also provide independent 
grounds to consider instances of public shaming unjustified. Public shaming can 
be impermissible because it violates privacy, as well as because its invasion of pri-
vacy causes a violation of the proportionality constraint. To see this, note that the 
privacy constraint operates in a quite different way to the proportionality constraint. 
Whereas the latter asks us to consult the distribution of positive and negative con-
sequences of public shaming, the former tells us that certain kinds of public sham-
ing are ruled out from the start. Public shaming that violates privacy is off the table, 
so to speak, even if it is more effective than alternative forms of public criticism, 
and thus meets the proportionality constraint. 
This constraint is interesting partly because of further questions it raises. For ex-
ample, is public shaming more likely to be justifiable when targeted at politicians 
and other public figures? Those who respond positively must supply us with an 
explanation for this verdict. One possibility is that public figures have forfeited cer-
tain rights to privacy. An alternative is that information that is usually irrelevant is 
relevant with respect to public figures. For example, the private life of a politician 
may be relevant to our assessment of her vote-worthiness, since this may reveal 
something significant about her character. We lack the space to pursue these pos-
sibilities any further here. 
4. Non-Abusiveness. This constraint rules out a range of abusive, insulting, and 
demeaning conduct from playing a role within public shaming.
29
 First, threats of 
murder, rape, or grievous violence are clearly impermissible, even if they are empty 
threats and not perceived as credible. Second, this constraint prohibits speech that 
disparages or attacks the norm violator on the basis of their race, sex, or other 
socially salient characteristics. Third, it also rules out insults, mockery, and shaming 
that amounts to mere character critique, rather than focusing on the norm viola-
tion. 
There are two justifications for this constraint. First, the forms of treatment that it 
prohibits are generally inconsistent with respecting the norm violator’s moral status 
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as a free and equal person. The inherently disrespectful nature of abusiveness 
means that it is never (or at least only exceptionally) appropriate to treat other peo-
ple in this way.
30
 Second, the conduct prohibited by this constraint is ill-suited to 
contribute to a practice of public accountability that sanctions norm violations and 
that strengthens our collective commitment to morally authoritative social norms. 
This practice requires criticism that is focused on norm violating acts, and that 
encourages the violator to recognize their wrongdoing and to express remorse. 
Threats of violence, insults, and racist speech do not appeal to the norm violator 
as a moral agent. Instead, they demean, belittle, and intimidate. 
Both of these justifications are important, since in some cases one or the other 
might not apply. In some cases, abusive shaming might be highly effective as a 
deterrent, or vividly communicate to the norm violator the extent to which others 
disapprove of her conduct, such that one might argue that it fulfills some of the 
functions of public shaming (so the second justification does not apply). In other 
cases, insults or jibes might seem too mild to be disrespectful of the targets’ status 
as free and equal (so the first justification does not apply). Together, however, the 
two arguments justify a constraint against a wide range of abusive conduct. Such 
conduct is prohibited when either of the two justifications applies. Most kinds of 
abusiveness will be ruled out by both arguments. 
The range of conduct ruled out by this constraint is thus identified by referring to 
its two justifications. The precise extent of this range, and thus where we draw the 
line for what counts as abusive, is a difficult question. We surely should not rule 
out all criticism that in any way strays from the specific norm-violating act. Com-
ments on norm violators’ more general character or vices can respect violators’ 
moral status and play a productive role within public shaming. But such comments 
can also fall into disrespectful character critique, which should be prohibited. Sim-
ilar vagueness surrounds what counts as an insult, or whether certain statements 
are sexist. We cannot draw precise boundaries here, but the fact that there are 
difficult cases does not show that this is not a genuine constraint.  
Abusiveness also affects proportionality, but like respect for privacy it supplies in-
dependent grounds for objecting to instances of public shaming. Public shaming 
can be impermissible because it is abusive, as well as because its abusiveness leads 
to a violation of the proportionality constraint. Again, abusive forms of public 
shaming are off the table, so to speak, even if they are proportionate. 
In reply, a critic might maintain that it is possible to conceive of cases in which 
abusive public shaming is justifiable. This might be the case if the norm violation 
                                               
30
 David Archard, ‘Insults, Free Speech and Offensiveness’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31 
(2013), 127-41. 
 
 
15 
is very serious and being abusive serves as a much more effective deterrent than 
any other means. We acknowledge the possibility of such cases, though we doubt 
that they are common. Moreover, even if abusive public shaming can in principle 
be justifiable all things considered, it remains prima facie unjustifiable by virtue of 
its abusiveness. Abusive public shaming always infringes rights, even if it does not 
always violate them.
31
 By characterizing non-abusiveness as a constraint on the 
prima facie justifiability of public shaming, we maintain this attractive conclusion.
32
 
5. Reintegration. Public shaming must aim at, and make possible, the reintegration 
of the norm violator back into the community, rather than permanently stigmatiz-
ing them. Shaming appeals to the norm violator as a moral agent, so it must not 
exclude them from the moral community or permanently assign them an inferior 
status.  
Toni Massaro draws a distinction between shaming and contempt: “shame-humil-
iation does not renounce the object permanently, whereas contempt-disgust 
does”.33 Within communities with healthy practices of shaming, it is “not under-
stood… as an expression of contempt that permanently renounces or expels the 
shame[d] member”,34 but instead shows that norm violations will be criticized and 
punished, with the aim of reconciling the violator and the community. A central 
feature of reintegrative shaming is that it seeks, and is receptive to, repentance on 
the part of the shamed. It features as a means of moral education, seeking to bring 
the offender to an awareness of the wrongness of their conduct and to produce 
reformation.
35
 In other words, public shaming need not, and should not, threaten 
an individual’s membership in the community or their dignity.36 
Non-reintegrative shaming is prohibited precisely because it constitutes a threat to 
the norm violator’s dignity. It is therefore ruled out even if it could function as an 
especially effective deterrent, or was seen as strongly communicating solidarity with 
those wronged by norm violations. While these are important functions of public 
shaming, they should not be achieved at the cost of the norm violator’s basic social 
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standing.
37
 This also explains why reintegration is a distinct constraint. A lack of 
reintegration will factor into proportionality, and non-reintegrative shaming will of-
ten be narrowly disproportionate, due to the severe negative consequences it im-
poses on the norm violator. But there is also a distinctive wrong in excluding 
someone from the moral community, rather than this simply being another nega-
tive consequence to take into account within proportionality analysis. Some public 
shaming might be proportionate, for example on account its deterrence effects, but 
nonetheless be impermissible due to failing to make reintegration possible. 
A corollary of this constraint, and of our remarks about both non-abusiveness and 
proportionality, is that shamers should retain some control over the nature and 
extent of public shaming.
38
 At the very least, shamers must ensure that they are 
aware of the risks of escalation, leading to violations of these constraints, and adjust 
their behavior accordingly. A lack of this kind of control is a central concern with 
respect to online public shaming, as we show below. 
This completes our account of the constraints on justifiable public shaming. At this 
point, a critic might ask how we know that this framework is complete. Might there 
not be other constraints that we have overlooked? It is impossible in principle to 
rule this out; clearly, we cannot consider every possible constraint one might sug-
gest. However, the burden is on the critic to justify further constraints that are dis-
tinct from those we have outlined. In particular, they would have to show that the 
proposed constraint is not subsumed by existing constraints. Our suspicion is that 
many of the normative concerns underlying putative further constraints would be 
adequately captured by being factored into the analysis of proportionality. Further, 
below we directly apply our framework to online public shaming, and the plausi-
bility of our analysis counts in favour of the completeness of the framework that 
we have developed. In other words, that the five constraints we have identified 
supply plausible results in a range of cases supports the verdict that they do not 
need to be supplemented. Before turning to this, however, we first consider and 
reply to a pressing objection. 
The Prohibition Objection 
A critic might object that our analysis thus far ignores the most normatively salient 
element of public shaming: the fact that it causes shame. Shaming should not be a 
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feature of our interpersonal relationships, because, given the nature of shame, 
shaming always involves demeaning another, suggesting that they are inferior or a 
worse kind of person.
39
 Inducing shame in others is in itself wrongful, and ought to 
be prohibited. In other words, there is a constraint on shaming itself, just as we 
have claimed that there is such a constraint against, say, abusiveness. This is the 
prohibition objection.  
This objection has particular force because shame is widely considered to be a 
particularly unwelcome, even morally defective, emotion. It is the emotion that one 
feels when one regards oneself as being negatively appraised by an audience that 
one respects, due to falling short of some standard of value that is accepted by that 
audience.
40
 It thus threatens one’s social standing and “is linked with the awareness 
of inadequacy, strangeness, limitation, or defeat”.41 Whereas guilt focuses our at-
tention on the victims of wrongful acts, shame focuses on the “nature of the self 
that has done these acts”.42 Shame is “less directed at the wrong done than at how 
we appear, or how others will receive us, or what good or bad opinion we are 
entitled to have of ourselves”.43 For proponents of the prohibition objection, public 
shaming wrongs the shamed individual by condemning them to a lowered social 
standing and a sense of being a “bad person”. 
While this is an important objection, it can be defused. Three responses are in 
order. First, and most importantly, recall the nature of the shaming that is deemed 
justifiable by our framework: proportionate, privacy-respecting, and non-abusive 
public moral criticism, in response to violations of social norms with which indi-
viduals are under a duty to comply, that does not permanently stigmatize the 
shamed individual. While wrongs such as abuse, violations of privacy, or sugges-
tions of permanent moral taintedness are often associated with shaming in practice 
(as we highlight below), they are distinct from it, and are ruled out by our con-
straints. The fact that shame is caused by shaming that meets our constraints is 
insufficient reason to prohibit it, even if such shame is an unwelcome or morally 
unattractive emotion. These harms are insufficient to justify the constraint on which 
the prohibition objection relies. 
Second, shame is a likely consequence of the most effective forms of public criti-
cism – indeed, this is why the term “public shaming” is appropriate. Public criticism 
will most effectively serve its various purposes when it is in response to a widely-
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endorsed norm that the norm violator accepts and internalizes. An individual who 
is rebuked by others in response to her violation of such a norm is likely to feel 
shame.
44
 Such public shaming is likely to cause the norm violator to recognize her 
wrongdoing, and perhaps to make amends, and to be especially effective as a de-
terrent and as a means to strengthen our shared commitment to the norm. In other 
words, the moral goods that can be achieved through public criticism are most 
likely to be realized when that criticism causes shame. Further, the shame might 
sometimes not merely be a side-effect, but itself be causally efficacious. The fact 
that an act causes shame might sometimes be what makes it an effective form of 
public criticism, and so one that has a strong justification. 
The point here is not simply that public shaming should not be prohibited because 
it can have good consequences. Rather, the point is that, in ruling out all acts that 
(foreseeably) induce shame, the prohibition objection is implausibly over-inclusive. 
The constraint would effectively rule out the whole practice of public moral ac-
countability. The objection is more plausible if it is narrowed such that it applies 
only to particular kinds of public shaming, such as those that involve highly per-
sonalized attacks, character assassinations, and so on. But our framework already 
rules these out, since they violate the constraints we have identified.
45
 
Third, the presence of shame will itself factor into the proportionality analysis, and 
thus affect whether the proportionality constraint is fulfilled. We have already seen 
that it can weigh in favor of public shaming, by increasing its positive consequences. 
But it also weighs against, since shame is itself a painful emotion, and thus a nega-
tive consequence. The harmfulness of shame is thus accounted for within calcula-
tions of proportionality.  
Applying the Framework 
Public shaming can be justifiable. Consider a simple case in which Jane queue-
jumps, skipping ahead of hundreds of people who are waiting patiently in line for 
tickets for a once-in-a-life-time gig. Some in the queue publicly criticize Jane for 
this, expressing their disapproval of Jane’s conduct. This is a case of public moral 
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criticism in response to the violation of a morally authoritative social norm,
46
 and 
so is an example of public shaming. Moreover, it can certainly serve the three roles 
of public shaming: communicating to Jane her wrongdoing in a way that elicits re-
morse, deterring Jane and others from violating the norm in future, and strength-
ening the group’s collective commitment to the norm.  
Our five constraints on public shaming can be fulfilled in this case. First, those in 
the queue can make sure that Jane is aware of her wrongdoing, and induce appro-
priate levels of remorse, without disproportionately harming her. Second, there is 
no less harmful way to achieve the relevant goods, and thus public shaming is also 
necessary. Additionally, the comments can be made in ways that do not make use 
of private information, are non-abusive, and do not permanently ostracize. In these 
ways, the public shaming can satisfy the third, fourth, and fifth constraints. 
Other cases of justifiable public shaming occur within particular associations and 
professions. Physicians have social norms regarding patient confidentiality and 
when disclosure of information is (im)permissible. Within academia, social norms 
govern appropriate relations between supervisors and their students. Some of the 
duties that arise from these norms are legally enforced, but others are upheld 
through professional codes of conduct. If a doctor believes that another has acted 
in ways that violate confidentiality norms, by inappropriately revealing details re-
garding a patient’s condition or carelessly leaving documents containing patient in-
formation within the view of others, for example, then it may be justifiable to shame 
the norm violator publicly, in front of their colleagues. The same may be true if a 
supervisor has sexual relations with one of his students. The public nature of the 
shaming makes it possible for the norm violator to recognize that he has violated a 
social norm shared by his professional community, enables others to affirm the 
standards that he must live up to, and provides an opportunity for the resolution 
of any interpretative disputes regarding those standards. This criticism can also 
meet the constraints we identified. 
What about online public shaming? We opened this paper with two stories in 
which individuals were shamed online for their words and actions. Can this kind 
of public shaming, carried out using social media, be justifiable? 
There is reason to think that it can be. The online world features communities of 
individuals interacting and participating in a shared practice of communication and 
public expression, which can be used effectively to uphold morally authoritative 
social norms. The large-scale, democratic, and self-regulating character of these 
communities may even give us reason to be more hopeful about the role of public 
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shaming in this sphere than in others. This kind of decentralized regulation (argu-
ably) reflects the values shared by ordinary users of the Internet, and so is not the 
product of the decisions of a powerful elite. 
Online public shaming can be used against violations of social norms that occur 
both in the offline world, such as in the cases of Stone and Hunt, and online. If an 
individual on Twitter violates a social norm, perhaps by tweeting something racist, 
then as fellow members of that community we might want to criticize this tweet and 
call attention to the fact that it fails to meet the standards to which Twitter users 
should adhere. Publicly responding to the offending tweet by expressing condem-
nation of it can encourage others to recognize the relevant norm and affirm their 
own commitment to it, and might cause the norm violator to acknowledge her 
wrongdoing. It may also have a deterrent effect. We might even believe that we 
have a duty publicly to condemn certain wrongful tweets in this way. 
However, the features that make online public shaming attractive also generate 
risks. In particular, the highly decentralized nature of this practice makes it very 
difficult to control. This counts against the justifiability of online public shaming. 
Several of the constraints that we have outlined are hard to fulfill when public 
shaming happens online. All of them can be fulfilled, but they often are not in real-
life cases, and the conditions of online interaction mean that there is always a high 
chance that at least some of the constraints will be violated. We expect that most 
readers will believe that there is something wrong with the kind of shaming involved 
in the cases with which we began. Applying our framework helps us to identify 
precisely why this is so.  
1. Proportionality. As we noted in relation to our opening cases, online public 
shaming often seems grossly disproportionate.
47
 There are at least four important 
concerns regarding online public shaming’s capacity to meet this constraint. 
First, with respect to violations of social norms that occur online, we should note 
that online norms are at an early stage in their development. There are active de-
bates about what standards of behavior we ought to uphold and whether certain 
forms of speech or expression, such as offensive jokes, are permissible. This means 
that an individual might not know the relevant norm, or might not be able to fore-
see that her action violates this norm. This lowers her culpability, which in turn 
reduces the level of negative consequences that she can be liable to bear. 
Second, cases of online shaming often involve actions that are seemingly misun-
derstood or misinterpreted by those engaged in the shaming. The Stone case is of 
this kind, as is the (in)famous case of Justice Sacco, who tweeted “Going to Africa. 
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Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!”48 Sacco meant this as an ironic 
comment about the attitudes of middle-class white Americans toward AIDS, but 
many considered it racist, leading her to face a barrage of online criticism and 
abuse. Sacco and Stone should have recognized that their actions could easily be 
understood as breaching social norms. Sacco’s tweet appears racist and Stone’s 
photo appears to mock the dead. On the other hand, all three were acting ironically 
in order to cause amusement.  
We might think that one can be culpable for foreseeably causing offence by seem-
ing to breach a norm, even if one has not in fact breached that norm. Even so, 
there remains a duty to interpret others’ actions in a charitable way. Stone’s and 
Sacco’s actions were certainly misjudged, but they should not be considered to 
have culpably violated norms in a way that makes them liable to public shaming. 
More generally, the risks of misunderstanding and misinterpretation within online 
public shaming are high. Justifiable criticism for norm violations must be based on 
a reasonable judgment that someone has culpably violated the norm, and this re-
quires charitable interpretation of her words and actions. This kind of interpreta-
tive charity is often absent in online interactions. 
Third, online public shaming is typically carried out by a large number of disparate 
individuals, none of whom has much control over the final outcome for the 
shamed individual. This can lead to forms of public shaming that are both narrowly 
and widely grossly disproportionate. We often observe ‘piling on’, where an in-
creasing number of individuals express their condemnation, leading the norm vio-
lator to experience deep distress and humiliation.
49
 Even if most participants do 
not want their targets to bear extreme burdens, the nature of online public shaming 
means that such outcomes can easily occur. Moreover, the burdens typically fall 
on both norm violators and their associates, such as friends, family, and employers. 
Finally, with respect to wide proportionality, there is an important worry that the 
practice of online public shaming will have negative systemic effects. Even if some 
individual instances of online shaming appear proportionate, the fear of being 
shamed might lead many – and especially those who are the most sensitive to oth-
ers’ views – to engage less in online interactions, or to refrain from posting anything 
that could be controversial. This could lead to an online environment that is less 
active and discursive. Ronson closes his book on public shaming by expressing this 
concern, quoting from a friend who no longer dares to post many of his jokes and 
observations online anymore. The friend states: “I suddenly feel with social media 
like I’m tiptoeing around an unpredictable, angry, unbalanced parent who might 
                                               
48
 Ronson, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed, 63-77.  
49
 Solove, The Future of Reputation, 95; and Klonick, ‘Re-Shaming the Debate’, 1054. 
 
 
22 
strike out at any moment”.50 The idea that the over-zealous enforcement of social 
norms might have a chilling effect that prevents free expression and limits individ-
uality is of course familiar from Mill.
51
 These dynamics pose a grave threat in the 
online world. Indeed, a recent report on social media trends found that “the con-
cern around digital footprints, and what you publish or ‘like’ on social networks 
coming back to haunt you, is making young people increasingly self-censoring, risk 
averse and socially rigid”.52 This is an important, yet neglected, reason for why so 
much online public shaming is unjustifiable. 
2. Necessity. Regarding the necessity constraint, online public shaming is likely to 
be highly effective in playing the communicative, deterrence-based, and expressive 
roles. It is doubtful that there are alternative courses of action that can serve these 
roles just as well or better, in a less harmful way. Indeed, public shaming is one of 
the most effective tools we have for playing the communicative and expressive roles 
– arguably sometimes more effective than state-based punishment. Again, this is 
due to its large-scale, democratic, and self-regulating character, which allows it di-
rectly to reflect the values of participants. However, the decentralization that helps 
online public shaming fulfill the necessity constraint is also what causes it frequently 
to violate other constraints. 
Further, as we noted above, some public shaming amounts to little more than 
“moral grandstanding”, which will often violate the necessity constraint. To the ex-
tent that grandstanding serves the expressive role, it could do so just as effectively 
without being critically targeted at a specific norm violation, and thus without being 
shaming. 
3. Respect for Privacy. This constraint can be fulfilled in principle, but in practice 
is often violated. This is illustrated by a very early case of online shaming.
53
 In June 
2005, a young woman’s dog defecated on the subway in South Korea, and she 
refused to clean up the mess when urged to do so by other passengers. Someone 
took photos of her and posted them on a popular blog. Within hours, she had 
been labelled “dog poop girl” and the picture, along with various parodies, were 
widely circulated online. People requested information about the woman and her 
family, and her name, age, and school were soon revealed. In the words of one 
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journalist, “online discussion groups crackled with chatter about every shred of the 
woman’s life that could be found”.54 
The decentralized nature of online public shaming increases the likelihood of the 
violation of this constraint. It is difficult to prevent people from finding and spread-
ing private information about shamed individuals. Invasions of privacy of this kind 
are such a common feature of online public shaming that a new term has been 
coined to describe them – doxing. Doxing is defined as searching for and publish-
ing private or personally-identifying information about a person on the Internet, 
usually with malicious intent. The popular link-sharing and discussion website Red-
dit has introduced a strict rule against doxing, and threatens to ban violators.
55
 This 
illustrates how members of online communities are aware of the risks of privacy 
violations, and are seeking to develop social norms that encourage respect for pri-
vacy. Online public shaming would be justifiable more often if such norms became 
well-established and respected. 
4. Non-Abusiveness. This is another constraint that can be fulfilled, but often is 
not – as we saw in Stone’s case. Again, the risk of this constraint being violated in 
any particular case is high, due to the large-scale and decentralized nature of online 
public shaming. The former makes it more likely that those with a propensity to 
abuse will become aware of the case and participate, while the latter makes such 
participation very difficult to prevent or control. Even if an individual intends to 
shame in a non-abusive way, the likelihood that others will be abusive is something 
that she should take into account. Even if her own contribution is non-abusive, her 
participation raises awareness of the case and makes it more likely that the criti-
cized individual will face abuse.
56
 
The extent to which an individual’s participation increases the chance of abuse 
depends on her own prominence within the relevant online community – for ex-
ample, the number of followers she has on Twitter. More prominent individuals 
should be particularly aware of the risks of exposing people to abusive attacks. Of 
course, prominent individuals also have a greater ability to bolster the relevant 
norm, precisely because they will draw more attention to the violation and thus 
cause more people to consider their own commitment to the norm. An individual’s 
prominence thus gives her both more and less reason to engage in online public 
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shaming: the putative benefits are greater, but so are the risks of the non-abusive-
ness constraint being violated. This point also applies to several of the other con-
straints we identify. For example, shaming from a more influential individual is 
more likely to be an effective deterrent, but also raises greater concerns of dispro-
portionality. 
A further grave concern is that online abuse is disproportionately directed at 
women and members of ethnic minorities.
57
 Women are much more likely than 
men to receive threats of physical violence, rape, and murder.
58
 This pattern is re-
flected in the abuse directed at Stone. It is striking and deeply troubling that those 
who are more vulnerable more regularly suffer such treatment. 
5. Reintegration. Public shaming can occur in a way that makes clear that it does 
not constitute a permanent rejection of the individual. However, there are limits to 
how clearly this can be done when shaming occurs on the Internet. Online public 
shaming often occurs through media, such as Twitter, that severely limit the space 
for explanation and are not well-suited to nuance. Furthermore, the mere fact that 
many people participate in the criticism and express disapproval makes it harder 
for the reintegrative aspect to be properly emphasized. 
Reintegration also sometimes requires that misdeeds are forgotten, or can no 
longer be brought up. This raises a further concern regarding online public sham-
ing because, in principle, online material can remain forever, and can be dredged 
up at any time. It thus threatens to be a permanent stain on an individual’s record, 
“an indelible blemish on a person’s identity”.59 We must overcome these hurdles 
to reintegration, perhaps through tighter regulation, if online public shaming is to 
be justifiable more often.
60
 
In the light of the numerous concerns regarding online public shaming that we 
have identified, can it ever be justifiable in real life? We think that it can, and that 
a case from within academia illustrates this point. In January 2016, a furore broke 
out regarding a paper by Jean-Yves Béziau, published in a special issue of the jour-
nal Synthese. The paper contained a passage that many readers considered homo-
phobic and sexist. The paper was discussed on social media and on several 
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prominent philosophy blogs, including Daily Nous and Feminist Philosophers.
61
 
Many participants in these discussions were highly critical of both Béziau and the 
editors of Synthese. Many considered Béziau and the editors to have fallen below 
the standards of good scholarship and breached the norms of the academic com-
munity, lowering their standing within that community. 
Plausibly, all of the constraints for justified public shaming were met in this case. 
A morally authoritative norm had been breached, and the shaming was propor-
tionate.
62
 The public shaming was also necessary, in the sense that there was no less 
harmful mechanism that would have been as effective in reinforcing social norms 
against homophobia and sexism, as well as in encouraging journal editors to ensure 
that articles published with their journals do not violate these norms. Indeed, the 
editors of Synthese put a moratorium on special issues, in order to reexamine their 
policies.
63
 The criticism respected the privacy of the relevant parties and was non-
abusive. Moreover, there was no suggestion that Béziau was to be shunned from 
the academic community, or that Synthese was to be completely mistrusted as a 
journal. Overall, this seems to be a case where online public shaming was carried 
out in a way that met the constraints we identified, and so was justifiable. 
Looking Forward: Accountability and Anonymity 
Our arguments raise the question of what we ought to do in response to the more 
general phenomenon of online public shaming, much of which is unjustifiable. A 
central solution is for us to develop clear and better social norms about the use of 
the Internet. We need norms that encourage restraint in criticism, sympathy in 
one’s interpretation of others’ words and actions, and a willingness to overlook past 
infractions so as to allow people to be restored into the community in good stand-
ing. We also need strong norms against doxing, abusive conduct, and seeking dis-
proportionate punishment. In other words, while the unjustified enforcement of 
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social norms is the central problem we have discussed, social norms also provide 
one of the most promising solutions.
64
 
Central to achieving this is greater accountability. It is desirable that those who 
shame others can themselves be held to account, taking responsibility for their crit-
icism and its effects, and being open to being criticized themselves. This requires 
that the norm violator, and perhaps others, enjoy a right of reply. This is desirable 
for two reasons. First, like due process laws, greater accountability acts as a safe-
guard against inaccurate and unwarranted criticism. It both deters potential 
shamers from engaging in such criticism and makes it easier for those wrongly ac-
cused of norm violations to correct these errors.
65
 Second, the shamer’s vulnerabil-
ity to criticism displays her sincerity, which enables public shaming to play its 
various roles better. Others may be more inclined to take the shamer’s claims se-
riously given her willingness to grant the right of reply. 
Several of the concerns regarding online public shaming that we have already dis-
cussed recur here. Currently, online shaming is often questionably accurate, and 
there are no clear mechanisms for correcting unwarranted criticism. Moreover, its 
disparate nature means that no particular participating individual can be held fully 
to account for the consequence of online public shaming. This is a familiar prob-
lem with so-called “collective harms”.66 
Nonetheless, there might be ways in which we can increase accountability. Those 
who engage in online public shaming could come to recognize the benefits of ac-
countability and endeavor to make themselves open to it, by being ready to listen 
to those they criticize, inviting open discussion of the norm violation, and admitting 
any errors they make. This kind of openness to accountability can be seen in the 
Béziau case: the shamers discussed what level of criticism was appropriate and 
were ready to listen to responses from Béziau and Synthese’s editors, as well as 
from third parties.
67
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It is important to highlight that those who respond to public shaming sometimes 
themselves engage in public shaming of the initial shamers, who they accuse of 
acting unjustifiably. This kind of exercise of the right of reply must itself abide by 
the constraints that we have identified. In practice, shamers often face a ‘shame 
backlash’ that violates these constraints.68 For example, Connie St Louis, who 
shamed Tim Hunt, suffered online abuse from those who considered her to have 
uncharitably misrepresented Hunt’s words. This is clearly unjustifiable, whether or 
not one believes the shaming of Hunt to have itself been justifiable. 
Importantly, if a shame backlash is severe then it might seem to jeopardize the 
justification for the initial shaming, by undermining its efficacy at fulfilling the com-
municative and deterrence-based roles. This is because public shaming that is re-
jected by its target and broader audience is less likely to elicit remorse or to act as 
a deterrent. This would be a troubling result. As Karen Adkins shows, this kind of 
unjustified retaliation is especially likely to be directed at members of minority 
groups, who often seek to enforce social norms that the majority express allegiance 
to but are inconsistent in following.
69
 Perversely, it thus might seem that the risk of 
shame backlashes undermines minorities’ moral justification for public shaming, 
making it a tool that can be justifiably used by the powerful only. However, even 
shaming that provokes a backlash expresses solidarity with victims and plays an 
important expressive role, so its justification is not in fact extinguished, even if it is 
weakened. The risk of shame backlashes means that members of minority groups 
unfortunately have stronger prudential reasons to be cautious about engaging in 
public shaming,
70
 but such shaming can still be justifiable. Of course, ideally, the 
right of reply should itself be exercised in justifiable ways, thus removing these 
concerns. 
An issue closely related to online accountability is anonymity. Anonymity might 
well be considered a central reason that online public shaming so regularly fails to 
meet the constraints we have discussed, due to the way it reduces the accountability 
of shamers. Anonymity makes it more difficult for the shamed, and others, to ex-
ercise their right of reply, which makes it less likely that inaccurate criticism will be 
corrected. Also, anonymous shamers make themselves less vulnerable to criticism, 
which may make others less likely to take their claims seriously. In turn, this means 
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that their actions serve the communicative and expressive roles less effectively, and 
so reduce the value of their public shaming. 
Empirical evidence links anonymity to abusiveness. Summarizing psychological re-
search in this area, Arthur Santana notes that “anonymity can foster a sense of 
impunity, loss of self-awareness and a likelihood of acting on normally inhibited 
impulses in a way that is markedly inconsistent with a person’s offline self”.71 San-
tana provides empirical evidence that anonymity increases the chance of abuse. He 
studied the comments on articles on the websites of eleven newspapers and found 
a markedly higher level of “incivility” – a category that included personal attacks, 
threats, abusive or hateful language, epithets, and racist sentiments – among anon-
ymous comments. Specifically, 53% of anonymous comments were uncivil, com-
pared to 29% of non-anonymous comments.
72
 It is likely that anonymity also 
increases the chance of invasions of privacy. 
These considerations might lead some to conclude that those engaging in online 
public shaming – and indeed online discussion more generally – ought not to post 
anonymously. Some online fora do not permit anonymity. Some newspapers re-
quire online commenters to use their real names, and Facebook requires that users 
use their authentic name and identity. These fora often appeal to accountability to 
justify these policies. 
There are also considerations in favor of anonymity, however. The ability to write 
anonymously allows individuals to express unpopular or marginal views with less 
fear of being personally attacked or criticized. Anonymity increases the number of 
participants and the range of views articulated within online discussions.
73
 Vulnera-
ble individuals might be more likely to interact online if they can do so anony-
mously. Perhaps ironically, this argument in favor of anonymity is persuasive 
precisely because online discussion and criticism is so often conducted in an ob-
jectionable way. There would be less need for anonymity if abuse, invasions of 
privacy, and so on, were not so rife. While anonymity has been shown to contribute 
to these problems, it might also be justified in the light of those same problems. 
More specifically, even engaging in anonymous online public shaming might be 
justifiable, especially for members of marginalized groups, in the light of the risks 
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of shame backlashes.
74
 At the very least, anonymity has certain benefits in the world 
in which we live. 
It is also worth noting that banning anonymity would not be a panacea. Santana 
found a troublingly high level of incivility even among non-anonymous comments 
– 29% were uncivil. Again, this shows the broader pressing need for the kinds of 
better social norms we listed above. 
Developing these kinds of norms is no small task, especially given the huge num-
bers of people who participate online. However, it is only through their emergence 
that the Internet can become a place where public criticism and shaming occurs in 
a justified way. In his 2007 book, Solove notes that the Internet was “now maturing 
into its second decade in mainstream culture – its teenage years”.75 The implication 
of this was that norms around its appropriate use, and the way online interactions 
ought to occur, were still emerging and developing. Ten years on, the need for 
greater maturity remains.
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